The State and Freedom of Assembly: Protestor’s Rights?


Lebanon Law Review | Lebanon | Lebanese Flag Protest Freedom Patriotism

Analytical Case Study of the Lebanese October Protests

Respecting the right of peaceful assembly is one of the main pillars of the rights of political participation in a state of law, and is considered a prerequisite for a healthy and democratic political practice. Without this overarching principle, democracy is impaired, elections are void, the risk that political parties stay inactive is high and political reforms become rare. In order to move towards societal peace and good governance, States need to protect and respect freedoms- a denial of this would ultimately result in a violent and non-democratic actions by society’s actors expressing their anger towards injustice, exclusion and marginalization. Indeed, one of the main instruments used to exert pressure on decision makers and to affect public policy makers is peaceful assembly. It is a vital democratic weapon available to cultural, political and societal components of the community in order to legally affect public opinions, defend common interest and object when objection is due. In a democratic political system, the right of freedom of assembly is guaranteed in the constitution, for people are the source of authority and people have the right to monitor and hold accountable those who exercise this right on their behalf. Despite the fact that states have the right to impose legal and temporary restrictions, they shall not confiscate or abolish those rights without justification, since peaceful assemblies are a driving force towards political and intellectual pluralism, supported by International Human Rights Law. In nuce, the right of peaceful assembly helps the political system to formulate policies that mirror people’s best interest, creating a state of harmony between decision makers and public opinion.

On the 17th of October 2019 the Lebanese revolution started. The protests have their origin in the country’s sectarian political system found on the ground of the 1991 Taef agreement. The system has been exploited by the current Lebanese ruling class and war lord for more than 30 years, following the 1975 Lebanese civil war. The outbreak of the protest may be attributed to accumulated crises in 2019, such as the dollar crisis, unemployment crisis, the gas stations striking, and the imposed tax on gas, wheat and online phone calls. Lebanese citizen have not had stable electricity since 1975, for they have to pay two electricity bills: one for the state, and the other to the generator mafia. Lebanon suffers from a deficient sanitation and sewage infrastructure which lead to the garbage crisis and the 2015 protests. Few days before the protests began, more than 100 wildfires took place all over Lebanon, damaging what is left of its countryside. The Lebanese government was unable to tame the fire because of a lack of maintenance of newly bought equipment, which led to aid being sent from neighbor countries such as Cyprus, Greece, Jordan and Turkey. Just like the snowball effect, the protests started to take place in small numbers on the 17th of October, yet quickly, millions of Lebanese took the streets to voice their concerns and to chant “Kelon yaa’ne kelon”. After 30 years of oppression, the Lebanese have finally decided to use their right to assembly freely in order to overthrow the government.

The legal question that can be deducted is: What is the freedom of peaceful assembly and what are the laws that govern such right? Not only that, but also, what are the state’s prerogatives and when can force be used during assemblies? 

§1 The Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

On the 17th of October, mass protests swept across Lebanon shortly after the government announced new tax measures. Hundreds of thousands of protestors chanted demanding the “fall of the regime”, all across Lebanon, in an unprecedented way. A simple google search can provide any person with hundreds of articles written by journalists and activists, documenting the facts, day by day. However, in order to understand what is really happening in Lebanon, protestors need to break up with the fake news that keep resurfacing and start to read the law to know their rights. It is essential to compare the Lebanese legal system to other state positions to be able to place our country on an objective scale of responsibility, then we shall determine whether or not the Lebanese government is bound by international human rights law, to conclude by extracting the seven guiding principles that Lebanon should follow when it comes to the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.

PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES AND STATE POSITIONS

The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association Maina Kiai (SR FPAA)1 defined an “assembly” as “an intentional and temporary gathering in a private or public space for a specific purpose. It therefore includes demonstrations, inside meetings, strikes, processions, rallies or even sits-in”.2 Accordingly, freedom of peaceful assembly3 is an individual right that allows people to come together to collectivity express and promote their collective ideas. The freedom of peaceful assembly is a human right as well as a civil liberty. States shall accord the freedom of peaceful assembly constitutional protection, which ought, at a minimum, to contain a positive statement of both the obligation to safeguard and the right to protest. All domestic laws that regulate the freedom of assembly must be lined with international instruments ratified by the state, such as the International covenant on civil and political rights, or the international declaration of human rights. The traditional tripartite typology of human rights obligations adopted by UN Treaty Bodies should be applied equally to all rights. As such, the right to peaceful assembly is no exception to the rule that state parties have the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil each right enshrined in the ICCPR as required by article 21(1).4 The obligation to protect is understood by the OCDE-ODIHR Guidelines as “the responsibility of the state to put in place adequate mechanisms and procedures to ensure that the freedom of assembly is enjoyed in practice and is not subject to unduly bureaucratic regulation”.5

As clearly highlighted by the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies in their joint report:

« The right to freedom of peaceful assembly includes the right to plan, organize, promote and advertise an assembly in any lawful manner. Any restrictions on such activities should be considered as a prior restriction on the exercise of the right. Restrictions on freedom of association and of expression may also effectively serve as a restriction on freedom of peaceful assembly.»6

The E.C.H.R7 considered that an assembly is peaceful whenever the participants and organizers do not have “violent intentions that result in public disorder”.8 The freedom of peaceful assembly only protects assemblies that do not disturb the public order. The European Court of Human Rights has stated that “in practice, the only type of events that did not qualify as ‘peaceful assemblies’ were those in which the organizers and participants intended to use violence.”9 The international community made a consensus10 on the fact that the use of violence by a minimal number of citizens won’t categorized an assembly as non-peaceful, for, an assembly is deemed peaceful if and only in the intentions of the participants were peaceful. The ECHR has clearly established in its case law Ziliberg v. Moldova that: an individual does not cease to enjoy the right to peaceful assembly as a result of a sporadic violence or other punishable acts committed by other in the course of the demonstrations, if the individual in question remains peaceful in or her intentions or behavior.11 Therefore, the term “peaceful” should be interpreted to include conduct that may annoy or give offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that it is seeking to promote, and even include conduct that temporarily hinders, impedes or obstructs the activities of third parties. Therefore, it could be agreed on mutatis mutandis that protests that remain peaceful preserve their right to assemble peacefully even when violence occurs within the assembly.

In France, the right to strike is protected by the constitution,12 without referring to the right of peaceful assembly, which however can be inferred from the 1789 Declaration of the man and the citizen which is incorporated into the French law.

In Italy, the right to peaceful assembly and the right to unarmed assembly are guaranteed by the constitution.13

Article 45 of the Portuguese constitution14 guarantees that every citizen has the right to peaceful unarmed assembly, without prior authorization from the State or the municipality.

Spain joins the other European countries stated beforehand by guaranteeing the right to peaceful and unarmed assembly in its constitution.15 However, organizers shall give prior notification to the authorities that have the right to ban assemblies on well-founded grounds when a breach of the public order is expected.16

In the United Kingdom, the Human Rights Act of 199817 stipulates that every resident has a number of fundamental rights and freedoms, to which include the right to freedom of expression and the right to assemble and associate with others peacefully. In the U.K, restrictions may be only be placed by the law for the necessities of democratic society.18

Public freedoms, including freedoms of expression and opinion, and subsequently the right to peaceful assembly are a major component of civil and political rights. In Lebanon, these freedoms are unfortunately subject to various violations. In Lebanon, the right to life, liberty, safety of persons as well as the right to peaceful assembly are guaranteed by the international and national legal framework in force. Peaceful assembly is one of the fundamental human rights that guarantees that all individual’s enjoy public freedoms and that democracy is served.19 Indeed, article 13 of the Lebanese constitution guaranteed the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, which means that Lebanon has successfully signed, ratifies and incorporated the provisions of the 1966 International covenant on civil and political rights, especially article 21.

PEACEFUL ASSEMBLIES AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

In international human rights law, freedom of assembly derives mainly from two legal instruments: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of human rights. UDHR adopted by the United Nations general assembly in 1948 is a declaration rather than a binding treaty. However, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its first Optional Protocol, were adopted in 1966 to give effect to the principles enunciated in the Declaration. Together, the three documents constitute the International Bill of Human Rights that target the protection of all unalienable rights and the application of the Jus cogens. The ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the UDHR are not the only treaties that have tackled the right to peaceful assembly, but are adopted by more than 150 states worldwide,20 which raises them to the level of a uniform international rule, applied equally to citizens of all genders, sex, color, status and race becoming a weapon in the hand of the community against the oligarchy.

One of the mainstream conventions that tackles the right to peaceful assembly is the American convention on Human Rights that is relevant to all members of the Organization of American States. Other relevant treaties include the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent States (the CIS Convention). The common ground shared between all those treaties and conventions is the fact that they safeguard the rights of those citizens to manifest and protest peacefully, on the grounds of protection of the fundamental freedoms attached to each and every human being.

Article 20(1), Universal Declaration of Human Rights

“Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association”.

Article 21, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

“The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.

Article 15, Convention on the Rights of the Child

“1. States Parties recognize the rights of the child to freedom of association and to freedom of peaceful assembly.

2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of these rights other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.

Freedom of peaceful assembly is not limited to the fact that groups can mobilize and revolt against their state to achieve a certain goal, however, it can serve many purposes including the expression of views and opinions which can strand in the preservation of minority identities and the development and maintains of culture. The right to peaceful assembly is complement by other rights and freedoms such as the freedom of association,21 the right to establish and maintain contacts within the territory of a state,22 freedom of movement,23 freedom of expression and freedom of thought, conscience and religion.24 That way, international human rights law pictures the right to freedom of assembly to be of a fundamental importance for the personal development of every citizen in a state of law, a fulfilment of every individual’s rights, and a guarantee to the progress and welfare of a democratic society.

Civil and Political Rights, called the “first generation” human rights, are enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of December 16, 1966. This treaty was adopted by Lebanon on November 3, 1972. In addition to the ICCPR, Lebanon took part in other international human rights commitments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, an integral part of the Lebanese Constitution, the International Covenant on economic, social and cultural Rights, the Convention on the rights of the child or the Convention against discrimination against women. However, these accessions are not enough to guarantee the respect of human rights in Lebanon. There is no transposition of the provisions enshrined in these treaties into the domestic law, which are rarely respected. Multiple violations of human rights are reported and which explains why various violations are being committed by the state during the protests, since there is no rule or law that honestly protects Lebanese protestors.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON THE RIGHT TO PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND CORE STATE OBLIGATIONS

The first principle that can be extracted from article 21 of the ICCPR is the presumption in favor of holding assemblies.25 Anything that is not expressly forbidden by law should be presumed to be permissible, for so, as a fundamental right in international law, the freedom of peaceful assembly shall be enjoyed without regulations. A presumption in favor of this freedom should be clearly and explicitly established in domestic law as it is clearly understood from the article referred to hereinabove. In Lebanon, no law limits the right of the citizens to assemble, which gives the protestors the right to freely exercise their freedom.

The second principle that can be selected is the state’s positive obligation to facilitate and protect peaceful assembly,26 for it is the primary responsibility of any governing organ to put in place adequate mechanisms and procedures to ensure that the freedom in practically enjoyed by the citizens.27 The protests have been overwhelmingly peaceful when a mob loyal to Hezbollah and Amal attacked and destroyed the main protest camp in central Beirut in the last week of October 2019, while army and internal security forces failed to protect protestors.28 This shows how Lebanon lacks in the application of its international duties after ratification of treaties.

Legality is the third principle that can be selected from the right to peaceful assembly since any restrictions imposed must have a formal basis in law and be in conformity with international human rights instruments.29 Local law must be compatible with international human rights standards and be sufficiently precise to enable protestors to know whether or not every single action they are committing is a breach of the law.

Fourthly, any restrictions imposed on freedom of assembly must be proportional. The principle of proportionality requires that authorities do not routinely impose restrictions that would fundamentally alter the character of a revolution, such as relocating assemblies to less central areas of a city.

Good administration is a principle that is directly related to the application of the right to peaceful assembly, since citizens should be informed of which body is responsible for deciding and regulating freedom of assembly, when law is vague.

The sixth deducted principal is the liability of the local regulatory authority that should be held accountable in a court of law in the event of any procedural or substantive failure to protect the right to peaceful assembly. We will be discussing this principle in section two.

The final and most important principle is “non-discrimination”. Everyone shall enjoy the freedom of peaceful assembly equally, for relevant authorities must not discriminate against any individual, groups, unregistered associations, legal entities, corporate bodies, members of ethnic minority, national, sexual and religious groups, nationals and non-nationals, children, women and men, law-enforcement personnel, and to persons without full legal capacity, including persons with mental illnesses. International human rights law instruments guarantee the principles of non-discrimination in many treaties, for example, article 26 of the ICCPR and Article 14 of the ECHR require that each state secure the enjoyment of the human rights recognized in these treaties for all individuals within its jurisdiction without discrimination.30

In order to clearly understand the equal rights policy among the society, four identifiable groups can be determined: unregistered associations and legal entities, minorities, women, and finally children.

Unregistered associations and legal entities have the full right to exercise the right to peaceful assembly just like individuals. This specification is found in many national jurisdictions such as the Bulgarian law on gatherings, meetings and manifestations.31

In sociology, a minority group refers to a category of people who experience relative disadvantage as compared to members of a dominant social group.32 Minority group membership is typically based on differences in observable characteristics or practices, such as: ethnicity (ethnic minority), race (racial minority), religion (religious minority), sexual orientation (sexual minority), or disability.33 Article 3(1) of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992) also states that “persons belonging to minorities may exercise their rights… individually as well as in community with other members of their group, without any discrimination.” What can be noted about the Lebanese revolution is that pro-LGBT right chants and banners are increasingly appearing next to the anti-government slogans. The “Kelon Yaa’ne kelon” and the “Louteh’ mana msabe” show that the Lebanese youth are not only targeting the ruling class, but a whole ideology that doesn’t represent them. The founder of Beirut Pride, Hadi Damien explained that gay rights are an umbrella for several objectives, for allies are not calling for marriage equality right away, rather than the decriminalization of consensual sex between adults in private.34

Concerning women, under Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),35 State parties shall take measures to ensure that women are enjoying and exercising all their rights as human and all fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men. Lebanese women have inspired the revolution, led the movement, and protected it from the machinations of the sulta.36 Since the very first days of the revolution, women have been on the frontlines. One of the first viral moments that galvanized the movement was footage of a woman kicking an armed security guard who threatened to open fire on protesters. As the protests grew in size and momentum, photographs spread on social media of young women and girls forming barriers between the army and demonstrators. The underlying reasons for doing so were to protect their male counterparts from violence by the army, defuse tensions, and maintain the non-violent nature of the protests.

Finally, just like adults, children have legitimate claims and interests which are safeguarded by local and international law. Freedom of peaceful assembly provides them with a means of expressing their views and contributing to society. Article 15 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child requires States Parties to recognize the right of children to organize and participate in peaceful assemblies.37 With a number of universities and schools deciding to open their doors on the 19th day of Lebanon’s revolution, many students have called for protests against this decision. This was a major catalyzer to the student union that formed all over Lebanon and that grouped more than 10’000 students- after years of attempts, kids and young adults were able to unite and demand their rights.38

Lebanon Protests
Photo Credits: Lyne Mneinmeh, Riad Al Soleh, 21 October 2019, 6:21 PM.

§2 The State’s Restrictions on the Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

According to the OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly States have a positive obligation to “protect and facilitate the right to freedom of assembly, rather than impose unnecessary or disproportionate limits on it.”39 However, sometimes the right to peaceful assembly can interfere with the freedom of certain classes, groups or organizations. Bills of rights allow reasonable, justified and legal limits on rights in a free and democratic society, for the ICCPR in its article 21 recognized the right of the State to limit the freedom of peaceful assembly in domestic law.40 The following section will discuss the principles and criteria that are applied by jurists to determine when the interference of the State in the right to peaceful assembly is justified.

LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

A) PUBLIC ORDER

According to the United States institute of peace,41 public order is «a condition characterized by the absence of widespread criminal and political violence, such as kidnapping, murder, riots, arson, and intimidation against targeted groups or individuals. Under this condition, such activity is reduced to an acceptable minimum, perpetrators are pursued, arrested, and detained, and the local population—no matter which party to the conflict they may belong to—is able to move freely about the country without fear of undue violence42

We understand from the above mentioned definition that public order is what keeps the society running smoothly, and what allows citizens to function efficiently.43 It is the objective of evert State to maintain and preserve national security, since it has a duty to assure that evert citizen is living in a safe environment where violence isn’t a recurrent incident. The freedom to assemble peacefully might be limited by the state’s obligation to safeguard and protect public order. The inherent imprecision of the term “public order”44 must not be used and exploited to prohibit or disperse peaceful assemblies. The hypothetical risk of public disorder, the presence of a hostile audience or other suppositions are not legitimate grounds to prohibit an assembly. On that topic, the European Court of Human Rights has noted that “an individual does not cease to enjoy the right to peaceful assembly as a result of sporadic violence or other punishable acts committed by others in the course of the demonstration, if the individual in question remains peaceful in his or her own intentions or behavior”. The burden of proof still lies on the State that should only restrict those assemblies when substantive proof is found showing that organizers and participants are more likely to use violence.45

When it comes to Lebanon, and in order to clearly understand whether or not the protests were violating public order, we shall analyze the acts that were done by the protestors. Amnesty, NY times, CNN, and Foreign Policy have all characterized the Lebanese protests as “peaceful”, making it the headline of major international newspapers. Even though some individuals might have vandalized walls, broken into stores, or even stole merchandize, it is not enough to label the protest as contrary to the public order, since the intention of each and every protestor is to overthrow the regime in a peaceful way.

B) PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF OTHERS

The state has a duty to find a balance between the importance of citizens to assemble peacefully, and the rights of the rest of the citizens to live, shop, work, trade or carry on business activities in localities affected by the assembly taking place. That balance should ensure that other activities taking place in the same space may also proceed if they themselves do not impose unreasonable burdens.46

Non-participants affected by the assembly might claim many rights are enunciated by the ICCPR such as the right to privacy (protected by Article 17 of the ICCPR) since it covers the physical and moral integrity of the person. Where it is claimed that a right to privacy is affected by freedom of assembly, the authorities should seek to determine the validity of that claim and the degree to which it should tolerate a temporary burden.  The right to liberty and security of person (Article 9 of the ICCPR), and the right to freedom of movement (Article 12 of the ICCPR) are some rights that could be potentially harmed during manifestations and protests.47 Across Lebanon protesters blocked main roads as part of their peaceful protest. The right of peaceful protesters to demonstrate on and block public roads has consistently been upheld by international human rights bodies which view urban spaces as a legitimate space for protest. The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association has stated that “the free flow of traffic should not automatically take precedence over freedom of peaceful assembly.”48

THE USE OF FORCE DURING ASSEMBLIES

The inappropriate, excessive or unlawful use of force by law-enforcement authorities can violate fundamental freedoms and protected rights, undermine police-community relationships, and cause widespread tension and unrest. The use of force should, therefore, be regulated by domestic law. Paragraph 13 of Resolution 690 on the Declaration on the Police adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1979 states that “police officers shall receive clear and precise instructions as to the manner and circumstances in which they may make use of arms”.

States have the obligation to develop a range of response that will allow them to use force proportionally, such as the usage of non-lethal weapons.49 For the international community has already adopted guidelines that regard the use of force in the context of dispersal of unlawful or violent assemblies. The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provide that “in the dispersal of assemblies that are unlawful but nonviolent, law enforcement officials shall avoid the use of force or, where that is not practicable, shall restrict such force to the minimum extent necessary.”50 The UN Basic Principles also stipulate that “in the dispersal of violent assemblies, law enforcement officials may use firearms only when less dangerous means are not practicable and only to the minimum extent necessary.”

The right to life stipulated in article 6 of the ICCPR51 does not only cover intentional killings, but is also applies to instances where the use of force by the governments results in life being taken away from a protestor. Its protection entails “a stricter and more compelling test of necessity”, stipulating that “the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the permitted aims”. 52 When assessing the use of force by law-enforcement officials, the European Court of Human Rights has applied the evidential standard, “beyond reasonable doubt”.53For, the burden of proof rests on the state in order to demonstrate that the use of force was not excessive, with sufficient strong proof.

A comparison of domestic, regional and international standards shows the existence of a consensus that dispersal of assemblies – a fortiori when they are entirely peaceful – must remain a measure of last resort while the protection of the rights of participants under article 6 and 7 ICCPR must be protected by facilitating an orderly dispersal. As highlighted by the SR FPAA and the SR SUMX in their joint report on the proper management of assemblies, “the normative framework governing the use of force includes the principles of legality, precaution, necessity, proportionality and accountability”.54

The following principles should underpin all occasions when force is used in the policing of public assemblies:

Where pepper spray or other irritant chemicals may be used, decontamination procedures must be set out;55

The use of attenuated energy projectiles (AEPs), baton rounds or plastic bullets, water cannon and other forceful methods of crowd control must be strictly regulated;

Under no circumstances should force be used against peaceful demonstrators who are unable to leave the scene; and

The use of force should trigger an automatic and prompt review process afterwards”.

In a statement released on the 18th of October 2019,56 the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor urged the Lebanese security services not to resort to repression and lethal force and respect the demonstrators’ right to peaceful assembly and allow them to express their views, having their rights guaranteed by article 13 of the Lebanese constitution. According to eyewitnesses, large numbers of security forces were deployed near Riad Al Solh Square and many areas in the Lebanese capital Beirut, where they fired a barrage of tear gas, causing dozens of protesters to suffocate and faint.

According to Amnesty International, on the 18th of October,57 Prime Minister Saad Hariri spoke to the Lebanese protestors, which ended with security forces using excessive force and huge amounts of tear gas to disperse crowds in Riad Al Soleh bloc, notwithstanding holding many citizens at gunpoint after beating them. On the 23rd of October officers from the Lebanese army and army intelligence forcibly removed protestors peacefully sitting on the ground at the main Awwali highway in Saida.58 They also kicked and beat protesters with iron batons as well as verbally assaulting them. In the Bedawi area on the 26th of October, the army opened fire on dozens of protestors performing peaceful sit-ins which constitutes a breach to IHRL. 59

THE LIABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF LAW-ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL

Law-enforcement personnel can face potential civil or criminal liability and disciplinary action if and only if the force used during assemblies was not authorized by law, and if the force used was more than necessary. Not only that, but also, law enforcement personnel can be held accountable whenever they fail to intervene when intervention was necessary to protect the rights of the protestors.

Governments must ensure that law-enforcement officials receive adequate training in the policing of public assemblies. Training should equip law-enforcement agencies to act in a manner that avoids escalation of violence and minimizes conflict, and should include “soft skills”, such as negotiation and mediation.

To conclude, policing assemblies should be governed by principles of good practice in order to avoid state liability. There seems to be a consensus in the international community on those principles of good practice that can be resumed with the following: 60

  • The policing operation should be characterized by a policy of “no surprises”: Law-enforcement officers should allow time for people in a crowd to respond as individuals to the situation they face, including any warnings or directions given to them.213
  • Law-enforcement command structures should be clearly established
  • Law-enforcement personnel should be clearly and individually identifiable
  • Intrusive anticipatory measures should not be used
  • Using mediation or negotiation to de-escalate tensions during an assembly
  • Law-enforcement officials should differentiate between participants and nonparticipants
  • Law-enforcement officials should differentiate between peaceful and non-peaceful participants
  • Strategies of crowd control that rely on containment (a tactic known in the United Kingdom as “kettling”) must only be used exceptionally
  • Protocols for the stop and search, detention or arrest of participants should be established
  • Facilitating peaceful assemblies that do not comply with the requisite preconditions or that substantially deviate from the terms of notification
  • Dispersal should not occur unless law-enforcement officials have taken all reasonable measures to facilitate and protect the assembly from harm
  • Photography and video recording (by both law-enforcement personnel and participants)

On November the 12th 2019, Alaa Abou Fakher –a 38-year-old father of three- was shot and killed by a soldier as protesters attempted to block the main Khaldeh highway located south of Beirut. Though initial media reports claimed he had died on the spot, it was later revealed that he succumbed to the gunshot wounds upon arrival to the hospital. Abou Fakher has been hailed as a “martyr of the revolution” by other protesters, and a mural depicting him was painted in the city of Tripoli. The officer that shot Alaa has been arrested and prosecuted according to a statement shared by the Lebanese army. The officer held a protestor at gun point for closing a road and decided to shoot him, which is considered a direct breach to article 21 of the ICCPR, the Lebanese code of military procedure and the Lebanese criminal code. Those committed acts hold the Lebanese army accountable, where recuperation should be due to the family of the decujus. The accountability and responsibility of the law enforcement personnel shall be decided by the independent Lebanese judiciary system, and justice should be served in a state of law.


Perla Khattar
Perla Khattar

Loyola University

Perla is a valedictorian of the Sagesse Law School and holds a masters’ degree in technology and privacy law from Loyola University through the Fullbright Scholarship.


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  20. Constitution of October 27, 1946, Preamble http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=358011F10FB952719BF7115C8D25B404.tpdjo17v_1?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071193&dateTexte=&categorieLien=cid.
  21. Constitution of October 4, 1958, Preamble http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071194,
  22. Constitution of the Italian Republic art. 17, para. 1 “diritto di riunirsi pacificamente e senz’armi”, http://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf.
  23. Convention on the rights of the child, article 15, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx
  24. ECHR Steel and Others v UK, Application n° 24838/94, judgement of 23 September 1998, para. 603; see also Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Routledge, 2009, p. 684.
  25. ECHR Steel and Others v UK, Application n° 24838/94, judgement of 23 September 1998, para. 603; see also Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Routledge, 2009, p. 684. 
  26. ECHR, Oya Ataman v Turkey, Application. no. 74552/01, 5 December 2006, para. 42.
  27. ECHR, United Macedonian Organization Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria, Application no. 44079/98, judgment of 20 October, 2005.
  28. ECHR, United Macedonian Organization Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria, Application no. 44079/98, judgment of 20 October, 2005.
  29. ECHR, Ziliberberg v. Moldova, application No. 61821/00, inadmissibility decision of 4 May 2004.
  30. ECHR, Ziliberberg v. Moldova, application No. 61821/00, inadmissibility decision of 4 May 2004.
  31. Frédéric Mégret, “Nature of Obligations”, in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah et Sandesh Sivakumaran (dir.), International human rights law, Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp 101‑102.
  32. Frédéric Mégret, “Nature of Obligations”, in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah et Sandesh Sivakumaran (dir.), International human rights law, Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp 101‑102.
  33. George, Ritzer (2014-01-15). Essentials of sociology. Los Angeles.
  34. Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy (2009), paras.204-205
  35. Handbook on Monitoring Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, OSCE- Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), p. 11.
  36. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, sch. 1, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/schedule/1.
  37. Human Rights Committee, “General comment No. 18:  Non-discrimination”, Thirty seventh session (1989), para. 9.
  38. Human Rights Council, Resolution 24/5, A/HRC/RES/24/5, adopted on 8 October 2013. 
  39. International covenant on civil and political rights, article 21, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
  40. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entry into force 3 March 1976, art. 21
  41. Ireland v. the United Kingdom (1978), para.161.
  42. Jeremy McBride, Freedom of Association, in The Essentials of… Human Rights, Hodder Arnold, London, 2005, pp. 18–20
  43. Joint Committee on Human Rights, Demonstrating Respect for Rights? Follow-up (London: HMSO, HL Paper 141/ HC 522, 14 July 2009), para.14
  44. Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, p. 6, para. 19. 
  45. Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, A/HRC/31/66, 4 February 2016, para. 16.
  46. Lebanese protesters clash with supporters of Hezbollah, Amal in Beirut, reuters, 25 November 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-protests/lebanese-protesters-clash-with-supporters-of-hezbollah-amal-in-beirut-idUSKBN1XZ013
  47. Lebanon protests explaines, Amnesty International, 1 November 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/11/lebanon-protests-explained/
  48. Lebanon’s WhatsApp revolution: protecting the right to peaceful protests, https://ifex.org/lebanons-whatsapp-revolution-protecting-the-right-to-peaceful-protest/
  49. OHCHR dashboard, https://indicators.ohchr.org/
  50. OSCE- Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Handbook on Monitoring Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, Warsaw/Strasbourg, OSCE/ODIHR, 2011, p. 76.
  51. OSCE/ODHIR Panel of Experts on the Freedom of Assembly, Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly, op. cit., p. 14, ppe. 2.
  52. OSCE/ODHIR Panel of Experts on the Freedom of Assembly, Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly, op. cit., p. 14, ppe. 2.
  53. OSCE/ODIHR, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly; Handbook on Monitoring Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), p. 21.
  54. Oya Ataman v. Turkey (2006)
  55. Principle 13, “Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials” (adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held in Havana (Cuba) from 27 August to 7 September 1990
  56. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association on his mission to the Republic of Korea, A/HRC/32/36/Add.2, 15 June 2016, para. 21.
  57. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association on his mission to the Republic of Korea, A/HRC/32/36/Add.2, 15 June 2016, paras 44-45.
  58. Students protest against the university’s decision to resume classes, Sandra Abdelbaki, 4 November 2019, https://en.annahar.com/article/1062120-students-protest-against-the-universitys-decision-to-resume-classes
  59. The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor report, 18 october 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanese-security-services-should-respect-demonstrators-right-peaceful-assembly-says
  60. The right to freedom of peaceful assembly, published in April 2017 by Maina Kiai, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, http://freeassembly.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/FOAA-Online-The-Right-to-Freedom-of-Peaceful-Assembly-update-Nov-2017.pdf 
  61. The United states institute of peace, Rules of Law, https://www.usip.org/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction-the-web-version/end-notes/rule-law#Public
  62. ‘This Revolution Has Raised the Bar.’ How Lebanon’s Protests Have Created a Surprising Space for LGBT Rights, Nabil Mounzer, 27 October 2019, https://time.com/5726465/lgbt-issues-lebanon-protests/
  63. Universal declaration of human rights, article 20(1), https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/
  64. Vyerentsov v. Ukraine, Application no. 20372/11, para. 52.
  65. Women and women’s rights are central to Lebanon’s protest movement, Fadi Nicholas Nassar, 5 November 2019, https://www.mei.edu/publications/women-and-womens-rights-are-central-lebanons-protest-movement
  1. The right to freedom of peaceful assembly, published in April 2017 by Maina Kiai, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association.
  2. Handbook on Monitoring Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, OSCE- Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), p. 11.
  3. Jeremy McBride, Freedom of Association, in The Essentials of… Human Rights, Hodder Arnold, London, 2005, pp. 18–20.
  4. Frédéric Mégret, “Nature of Obligations”, in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah et Sandesh Sivakumaran (dir.), International human rights law, Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp 101‑102.
  5. OSCE/ODHIR Panel of Experts on the Freedom of Assembly, Guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly, op. cit., p. 14, ppe. 2.
  6. Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, p. 6, para. 19. 
  7. The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its protocols (the European Convention on Human Rights) is an international treaty adopted by the Council of Europe to protect and safeguard the rights and freedoms of individuals living within the jurisdiction of the forty-seven Member States of the Council of Europe who have ratified the Convention.
  8. ECHR Steel and Others v UK, Application n° 24838/94, judgement of 23 September 1998, para. 603; see also Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Routledge, 2009, p. 684. [1] Cisse v. France (2002), para.37.
  9. Cisse v. France (2002), para.37
  10. Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova (No.2) (2010), para.23: “The burden of proving the violent intentions of the organizers of a demonstration lies with the authorities.” 
  11. ECHR, Ziliberberg v. Moldova, application No. 61821/00, inadmissibility decision of 4 May 2004.
  12. Constitution of October 4, 1958, Preamble Article, referring to Constitution of October 27, 1946, Preamble Article,
  13. Constitution of the Italian Republic art. 17, para. 1 “diritto di riunirsi pacificamente e senz’armi”
  14. Constituição da República Portuguesa (VII Revisão Constitucional, 2005), art. 45(1).
  15. Constitución Espanola [C.E.] [Spanish Constitution] art. 21(1), Boletín Oficial del Estado [B.O.E.], Dec. 29, 1978.
  16. The Spanish authorities have the right to ban assemblies, according to Ley Orgánica 9/1983, art. 5. in three situations: When they are considered illegal according to criminal law, when they create public disturbances, putting people or property at risk, or when participants wear paramilitary uniforms.
  17. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, sch. 1
  18. The Human Rights Act of 1988 provides that any restrictions must be necessary in a democratic society and “in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” The Act further provides that there must be no discrimination in the operation of these rights and freedoms on any grounds, including sex, race, religion, or political views.
  19. Lebanon’s WhatsApp revolution: protecting the right to peaceful protests.
  20. OHCHR dashboard.
  21. Article 22 of the ICCPR and Article 11of the ECHR.
  22. Article 17, Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities, which draws upon paras. 32.4 and 32.6 of the Copenhagen Document of the CSCE.
  23. Article 12 of the ICCPR and Article 2 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR.
  24. Article 19(2) and (3) of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the ECHR. Freedom of expression includes the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authorities and regardless of frontiers. The European Court of Human Rights has recognized that freedom of assembly and freedom of expression are often, in practice, closely associated, Ezelin v. France (1991).
  25. The measures taken by the authorities and interfering with the right to freedom of assembly should always have a legal basis under domestic law and the law should be accessible to the persons concerned and formulated with sufficient precision (Vyerentsov v. Ukraine, Application no. 20372/11, para. 52.)
  26. In the case of Christians against racism and fascism/United Kingdom (Application no. 8440/78, 16 July 1980) the Commission held that a general ban on demonstrations can only be justified is there is a real danger of their resulting in disorder which cannot be prevented by other less stringent measures.
  27. “Joint Statement on Racism and the Media by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression”, available at: . Also see Helen Fenwick, “The Right to Protest, the Human Rights Act and the Margin of Appreciation” Modern Law Review, Vol. 62, No. 4, July 1999, pp. 491-492-3.
  28. Lebanese protesters clash with supporters of Hezbollah, Amal in Beirut, reuters, 25 November 2019.
  29. Vyerentsov v. Ukraine, Application no. 20372/11, para. 52.
  30. [1]  “General Comment 18: Non-Discrimination”, UN Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR General Comment 18, (1989).
  31. Article 2, Bulgarian Law on Gatherings, Meetings and Manifestations (1990): Gatherings, meetings and manifestations can be organized and held by [individuals], associations, political and other social organizations.
  32. 1945-, Healey, Joseph F. (2018-03-02). Race, ethnicity, gender, & class : the sociology of group conflict and change. Stepnick, Andi,, O’Brien, Eileen, 1972- (Eighth ed.). Thousand Oaks, California.
  33. George, Ritzer (2014-01-15). Essentials of sociology. Los Angeles.
  34. ‘This Revolution Has Raised the Bar.’ How Lebanon’s Protests Have Created a Surprising Space for LGBT Rights, Nabil Mounzer, 27 October 2019.
  35. Article 7(c), CEDAW also safeguards the right of women to participate in NGOs and associations concerned with the public and political life of the country.
  36. Women and women’s rights are central to Lebanon’s protest movement, Fadi Nicholas Nassar, 5 November 2019, https://www.mei.edu/publications/women-and-womens-rights-are-central-lebanons-protest-movement.
  37. Article 15, Convention on the Rights of the Child.
  38. Students protest against the university’s decision to resume classes, Sandra Abdelbaki, 4 November 2019.
  39. OSCE/ODIHR, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly; Handbook on Monitoring Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), p. 21.
  40. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entry into force 3 March 1976, art. 21.
  41. The United states institute of peace, Rules of Law.
  42. Colette Rausch, ed., Combating Serious Crimes in Post-Conflict Societies: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2006). Hereafter: Rausch, Combating Serious Crimes, 2006.
  43. Conklin, John E. (1997). Criminology. 6th edition. Allyn & Bacon.
  44. In the Brokdorf decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court (1985) (1 BvR 233, 341/81), for example, “public order” was understood as including the totality of unwritten rules, obedience to which is regarded as an indispensable prerequisite for an orderly communal human existence within a defined area according to social and ethical opinions prevailing at the time.
  45. Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova (2010), para.27. Finding a violation of Article 11 of the ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights stated that “the applicant party’s slogans, even if accompanied by the burning of flags and pictures, was a form of expressing an opinion in respect of an issue of major public interest, namely the presence of Russian troops on the territory of Moldova”.
  46. In Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzuge v. Republik Osterreich (2003), the European Court of Justice held that allowing a demonstration that blocked the Brenner Motorway between Germany and Italy for almost 30 hours was not a disproportionate restriction on the free movement of goods under Article 28 of the EC Treaty). The Court provided three reasons: (1) the disruption was a relatively short duration and on an isolated occasion; (2) measures were taken to limit the disruption caused; and (3) excessive restrictions on the demonstration could have deprived the demonstrators of their rights to expression and assembly, and indeed possibly caused greater disruption. The authorities determined that they had to allow the demonstration to go ahead because the demonstrators were exercising their fundamental rights of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly under the Austrian constitution.
  47. The right to free movement does not generally refer to the use of public roads but, rather, to the possibility of changing one’s place of residence. Judgement of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Case 21/05, 18 January 2006 (also cited in the decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, Decision 75/2008, (V.29.) AB, para.2.3).
  48. Lebanon protests explaines, Amnesty International, 1 November 2019.
  49. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990, principles 9-14.
  50. Principle 13, “Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials” (adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held in Havana (Cuba) from 27 August to 7 September 1990
  51. Article 6(1) « Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life ».
  52. Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy (2009), paras.204-205.
  53. Ireland v. the United Kingdom (1978), para.161.
  54. ECHR, Oya Ataman v Turkey, Application. no. 74552/01, 5 December 2006, para. 42.
  55. Oya Ataman v. Turkey (2006), the European Court of Human Rights held that neither tear gas nor pepper spray were considered chemical weapons under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (1993). It further noted that pepper spray, “used in some Council of Europe Member States to keep demonstrations under control or to disperse them in case they get out of hand … may produce side-effects such as respiratory problems, nausea, vomiting, irritation.”
  56. The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor report, 18 October 2019.
  57. Lebanon protests explaines, Amnesty International, 1 November 2019.
  58. Ibid.
  59. Ibid.
  60. Joint Committee on Human Rights, Demonstrating Respect for Rights? Follow-up (London: HMSO, HL Paper 141/ HC 522, 14 July 2009), para.14

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